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Abstract
The presence of a change in a visual scene can influence brain activity and behavior, even in the absence of full conscious
report. It may be possible for us to sense that such a change has occurred, even if we cannot specify exactly where or what it
was. Despite existing evidence from electroencephalogram (EEG) and eye-tracking data, it is still unclear how this partial
level of awareness relates to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activation.
Using EEG, fMRI, and a change blindness paradigm, we found multi-modal evidence to suggest that sensing a change is dis-
tinguishable from being blind to it. Specifically, trials during which participants could detect the presence of a colour change
but not identify the location of the change (sense trials), were compared to those where participants could both detect and
localise the change (localise or see trials), as well as change blind trials. In EEG, late parietal positivity and N2 amplitudes
were larger for localised changes only, when compared to change blindness. However, ERP-informed fMRI analysis found no
voxels with activation that significantly co-varied with fluctuations in single-trial late positivity amplitudes. In fMRI, a range
of visual (BA17,18), parietal (BA7,40), and mid-brain (anterior cingulate, BA24) areas showed increased fMRI BOLD activation
when a change was sensed, compared to change blindness. These visual and parietal areas are commonly implicated as the
storage sites of visual working memory, and we therefore argue that sensing may not be explained by a lack of stored repre-
sentation of the visual display. Both seeing and sensing a change were associated with an overlapping occipitoparietal net-
work of activation when compared to blind trials, suggesting that the quality of the visual representation, rather than the
lack of one, may result in partial awareness during the change blindness paradigm.
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Introduction
It is common for us to overestimate the amount of information
that we can process and store about the world around us.
Although we may assume that we would notice a cyclist entering
the path of our car, or if a building on our street changed in col-
our, we very often miss these occurrences (Simons and Levin,
1997; Simons, 2000). The failure to detect changes between visual
scenes is known as change blindness, and is used as evidence to
suggest that our internal representation of the outside world is
not as complete as once thought (Noe et al., 2000; Rensink, 2004).
When changes to an image are disrupted in some way, for exam-
ple by a distractor image or a visual saccade, we cannot use vi-
sual transients (or motion) to detect them, and are often blind to
the difference (Rensink et al., 1997; Kanai and Verstraten, 2004).
It was previously assumed that if we are blind to a change
then we cannot provide any information about it, and that the
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change should not influence our behavior in any way. Blindness
to changes is thought to result from a lack of detailed represen-
tation about the pre- and post-change scenes, or an inability to
successfully compare the two (Simons, 2000). If this is the case,
then our knowledge when we are blind to changes should be
equivalent to that when there is no change at all. Anecdotally,
this does not align with the experience of observers in a change
blindness experiment; it is common for them to remark that
they suspected something had changed, but that they were not
sure about its nature or location. This experience appears to be
phenomenologically different from complete change blindness,
but how this difference is reflected in behavioral and neuroim-
aging data is unclear.
In the domain of visual consciousness, there is a recurring
debate on the nature of visual awareness; whether it is graded,
or dichotomous, or a combination determined by the context. In
the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 2006), it is posited that aware-
ness arises when inputs cross a threshold for “ignition,” result-
ing in the distribution and maintenance of information within a
“global workspace.” Based on this proposal, conscious aware-
ness is a dichotomous state, as only inputs selected by attention
can spark the activation of the global workspace. This consists
of a large network of connected regions, including prefrontal
and parietal regions as well as the thalamic nuclei and basal
ganglia (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Therefore, conscious
awareness requires directed attention and activation of a dis-
tributed frontal-parietal network, in an “all-or-nothing” fashion.
In accordance with this, functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) studies specifically investigating change blindness
report that detected changes are associated with greater activa-
tion in the parietal lobe, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and fusi-
form gyrus, when compared to changes that are missed (Beck
et al., 2001). Few regions were specifically activated when partic-
ipants exhibited change blindness compared to no-change trials
(right lingual gyrus, right fusiform gyrus, and right inferior fron-
tal gyrus). Further, detected changes compared with correctly
categorized no-change trials revealed activation in a wider net-
work including the inferior, superior, and medial temporal gy-
rus, anterior interparietal sulcus, precuneus, central sulcus,
inferior frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), putamen,
pulvinar, and cerebellum (Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004). A simi-
lar pattern was identified for false alarm trials, where partici-
pants reported a change when no change occurred, suggesting
that activity was related to the participants’ perception of the
change rather than properties of the visual stimulus.
However, this “all-or-nothing” explanation of visual aware-
ness does not align with our subjective experience of the world.
Based on participants’ report of a sense for something changing,
we might conclude that awareness is graded. This allows for a
level, or levels, of awareness lying somewhere on a continuum
between full and absent awareness. In an early experiment,
Rensink (2004) suggested the presence of a sense condition, in
which observers could detect a change without fully identifying
it. Observers were asked to indicate when they “thought” that
something had changed, and then again when they were cer-
tain of it. He argued that this sense condition is both phenome-
nologically and perceptually distinct from the traditionally
reported see condition in which participants are fully aware of
what change occurred.
This definition has been extended and explored using elec-
troencephalogram (EEG) and eye-tracking, with a range of
results suggesting a richer visual experience than either “yes I
saw a change” or “no I didn’t see anything” (Thornton and
Fernandez-Duque, 2001; Fernandez-Duque and Thornton, 2003;
Galpin et al., 2008; Kimura et al., 2008; Busch et al., 2009; Lyyra
et al., 2012; Howe and Webb, 2014; Reynolds and Withers, 2015;
Chetverikov et al., 2018). The distinction could be described by
the “partial awareness hypothesis” (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007;
Kouider et al., 2010). While the mechanism of awareness can
still be considered dichotomous and dependent on an ignition
threshold, the level of detail contained within the workspace is
variable. Stimuli can be represented with varying detail, based
on factors such as stimulus strength, therefore giving rise to
graded knowledge of its contents.
In a previous EEG experiment (Scrivener et al., 2019), we dis-
tinguished between trials in which participants could detect the
presence of a colour change but not identify the location of the
change (sense trials), versus those where participants could both
detect, and localise the change (localise trials). We chose to mea-
sure several ERPs that are commonly linked to visual attention
and awareness, including the visual P1 and N1, visual aware-
ness negativity (VAN), N2pc, and late positivity (LP) (Koivisto
and Revonsuo, 2010; Förster et al., 2020). Although suggested as
one of the earliest reflection of conscious visual awareness
(around 200 ms after stimulus onset), we found no statistically
significant differences in the VAN ERP across conditions, con-
trary to previous findings (Wilenius and Revonsuo, 2007;
Koivisto et al., 2008; Busch et al., 2009; Förster et al., 2020).
In a similar time window, the N2pc is characterized by an in-
creased negativity at visual electrodes contralateral to the
change location, and is increased for aware versus unaware tri-
als (Luck and Hillyard, 1994; Schankin and Wascher, 2007). In
our previous results, both awareness conditions (localise and
sense) were significantly different to trials with no change detec-
tion (blind trials), suggesting that the N2pc is not dependent on
explicit awareness. It is possible that sense trials elicited a shift
in attention to the correct hemifield of change (and therefore an
N2pc was detected), but that this was not specific enough to de-
termine the exact location of the change.
Within the LP range (400–600 ms after change onset), all con-
ditions were significantly different from one another. The LP
overlaps with the P3 component at central parietal electrode
sites, and is often associated with conscious aspects of task
processing (Busch et al., 2009; Koivisto et al., 2009; Railo et al.,
2011). Overall, it appears that simply “detecting” a change can
be distinguished from “describing” a change, in both subjective
and neuroimaging results, and that participants can sense a
change without complete knowledge of what occurred.
The main aim of this experiment was to examine the exis-
tence and nature of the sense condition in the change blindness
paradigm, using combined EEG-fMRI and behavioral measures.
While a range of evidence posits a distinction between sense
and blind conditions in EEG data, no such distinction has been
made for the sense condition in change blindness using fMRI.
One criticism of the sensing hypothesis is that participants who
sense a change are simply applying a more liberal response cri-
terion when completing the task, and in fact are not aware of
the change at all (Simons et al., 2005). Similarly, implicit aware-
ness of changes could also be explained by explicit mechanisms
such as guessing or a process of elimination (Mitroff et al., 2002).
If this is the case, then we would expect to find no significant
differences between sense and blind trials in fMRI BOLD activa-
tion. This result could also support the hypothesis of visual
consciousness as dichotomous. However, if sensing lies some-
where on a continuum between aware and unaware, perhaps
explained by varying precision of the stimuli representation
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within the global workspace, then BOLD activation for sense tri-
als may be separable to both fully aware and change blind trials.
Further, we aimed to improve the respective temporal and
spatial resolution of EEG and fMRI by measuring them simulta-
neously. In an extension to our previous EEG results (Scrivener
et al., 2019), we investigated how EEG correlates of visual aware-
ness relate to changes in fMRI BOLD. We therefore aimed to
identify brain regions with BOLD activity that co-varied with ac-
tivity in the EEG data, to detect possible sources or networks as-
sociated with awareness of changes.
Materials and Methods
All materials and analysis methods were pre-registered in an
open document on the Open Science Framework, where the
data and analysis for this project can also be found (https://doi.
org/10.17605/OSF.IO/W6BH3). Structural images were defaced
using Brainstorm3 (Tadel et al., 2011) in MATLAB (MathWorks,
Inc., version 2014a) with SPM8.
Participants
Twenty one right-handed subjects (mean 6 SD, age ¼ 21 6 3.6,
6 male) with no history of psychiatric or neurological disorders
participated in this EEG-fMRI study. All had corrected-to-normal
vision and were not colour blind (based on self-report). The ex-
periment was approved by the University of Reading ethics
committee (UREC: 16/120), and was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki (as of 2008). All participants
gave informed consent to take part, including consent to share
their anonymized data. For EEG and behavioral analysis, one
participant was removed due to failure to remove MRI related
artifacts from the EEG, leaving N¼ 20. Four additional partici-
pants were removed from the fMRI and EEG-fMRI analysis for
having motion greater than one voxel size in the fMRI data,
leaving N¼ 16.
Stimuli and procedure
A change blindness task was presented using Psychtoolbox
(Kleiner et al., 2007), on a 1920 x 1080 LCD monitor with a 60 Hz
refresh rate. The paradigm was displayed on a screen approxi-
mately 47 cm away from the center of the scanner bore. This
was viewed by the participant through a mirror mounted onto
the coil, at approximately 12 cm from the participant’s eyes. In
their left hand, the participant held an alarm ball, and in their
right they held a four key button box. They had to use all of the
four keys to respond to the task. Participants were asked to fix-
ate on a central fixation cross and identify changes between
consecutive displays of coloured squares. These were inter-
rupted by a short fixation display to facilitate the change blind-
ness phenomenon (see Fig. 1 for details on display duration). On
change trials, one of the squares changed colour from the first
to the second display. On no-change trials, the displays were
identical. This was followed by two or three questions, depend-
ing on the participant’s response to the first question.
Question 1 asked “Did you see a change?” to which partici-
pants could respond “yes” or “no.” Question 2 asked participants
to localise the change, based on a 2 x 2 grid from top left to bot-
tom right. Question 3 asked how certain participants were of
their responses, ranging from “1: Very Uncertain” to “4: Very
Certain.” If participants responded “no” change to question 1,
they were asked to press any button to ensure the same number
of button presses were made during each trial. We did not ask
participants who did not see the change to guess a location, as
our hypotheses did not relate to “implicit” change detection, as
reported in Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2000). Participants
were asked to respond within a limit of 2 s for each question,
and trials with any response missing were not included in fur-
ther analysis.
This study had a within-subjects repeated measures design,
and each participant completed 5 blocks of 50 trials, meaning a
total of 250 trials. Of these 250 trials, 165 contained a change in
coloured square, and the remaining trials contain no change.
These trial numbers were selected after consideration of the
maximum amount of time participants would be willing and
able to attend to the task, especially with concurrent neuroim-
aging recording. The ratio was not kept at 50/50, as the trials
containing the change were of most interest for analysis
(Fernandez-Duque and Thornton, 2003; Howe and Webb, 2014).
However, after the experiment participants were asked to report
the percentage of trials that they believed contained a change
(none of which were correct). After each block of 50 trials, the
participants were presented with a break screen, advising them
to take a break. The participant was able to continue the experi-
ment at their discretion by pressing any button on the button
box. Before beginning the main task, participants were given a
short block of 10 trials in which to practice responding to the
paradigm with the button box. The data from this practice block
was not analysed.
Difficulty was modulated in real time by adding and remov-
ing two squares from the display, based on the assumption that
more distractors increases task difficulty (Vogel et al., 2005).
This was to prevent floor and ceiling performance during the
task as a result of individual differences (Luck and Vogel, 2013),
and optimize for performance rather than to establish specific
individual thresholds. Performance over the previous two trials
was used to update the current trial; two consecutive correct
answers added two squares, two incorrect deducted two
squares, and one correct and one incorrect resulted in no
change. The decision to increase or decrease the number of
squares was made using responses to the localization question
(Q2), as we were specifically interested in controlling the num-
ber of sense and localise trials. The number of squares always
changed by two, to balance the number on the left and right
hemifields of the screen. The location of the change on each
trial was random, but the change occurred an equal number of
times on the left and right side. The display was divided into 36
even sections, with 6 in each quadrant, and within which the
squares could appear. As the colour of the squares was not re-
lated to our main hypotheses, we used seven default MATLAB
colours; blue, cyan, yellow, green, white, red, and magenta
(MathWorks, Inc., version 2016b).
Behavioral analysis
The trials in which a change occurred were divided into three
conditions: blind (no change detection), localise (change detec-
tion and localization), and sense (change detection without lo-
calization). Trials in which no change occurred were divided
into correct rejection (no change reported) and false alarm
(change incorrectly reported). The number of false alarm tri-
als was low, with a mean of 10 trials (range ¼ 1 28, SD ¼
7.34), and therefore EEG analysis comparing false alarm to
sense trials was not performed due to a lack of power. The per-
centage of false alarm trials was calculated in relation to the
total number of no-change trials, whereas the percentage of
sense trials was calculated in relation to the total number of
change trials.
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Detection accuracy for each participant was calculated based
on the percentage of change trials in which they correctly
detected a change. Localization accuracy was calculated as the
percentage of correctly detected changes where the localization
was also correct. We also recorded each participant’s mean and
maximum difficulty scores, with the maximum referring to the
highest number of squares that were displayed to them during
the experiment. Behavioral analysis was completed in JASP
2018 (version 0.8.2.0).
D’prime was calculated as a measure of participant response
bias. This was calculated using the equation d ¼ zðhit rate-
false alarm rateÞ (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). Response bias,
or criterion, was also calculated, where c ¼ 0:5  ðzðhit rate-
false alarm rateÞÞ . c¼ 0 indicates no response bias to either
“yes” or “no” responses. c> 0 indicates a bias toward “no”
responses, with fewer hits, and fewer false alarms. c< 0 indi-
cates bias toward “yes,” with more hits but also more false
alarms.
One problem faced in identifying a sense condition is that it
is difficult to distinguish these trials from those where partici-
pants did not really see a change (similar to a false alarm during
no change trials), or those where participants press the wrong
response key (Mitroff et al., 2002; Simons and Ambinder, 2005).
Rensink (2004) found that reaction times when participants
thought that they had seen a change were shorter for change
trials than no-change trials, meaning that participants were
slower when they were simply making a false alarm. Galpin
et al. (2008) also found greater certainty associated with sensing
during change trials, compared to false alarms. We therefore
compared reaction times across awareness conditions, as well
as between levels of confidence. As trial numbers were low,
“very uncertain” and “uncertain” responses were combined,
and “certain” and “very certain” were combined. Each aware-
ness condition therefore had two levels of certainty; for exam-
ple, localise certain and localise uncertain.
To establish if the location of the change influenced the like-
lihood that it was detected, we conducted two chi-square analy-
ses. The first analysis divided the 6 x 6 grid of possible change
locations into two conditions, outside and central. Changes oc-
curring in any of the 20 outermost locations were considered to
be outside changes, and the 16 central locations were consid-
ered to be central. We ran a 2 x 3 chi-square with the indepen-
dent variables of location (outside/central) and awareness
(blind/localise/sense), and the dependent variable as the fre-
quency of trials within each condition, across participants. In
the second analysis, we instead compared the side of the dis-
play in which the change occurred, resulting in a 2 x 3 chi-
square for hemisphere (left/right) and awareness (blind/localise/
sense).
A chi-square test was used to compare the frequency of each
colour change occurring across awareness conditions (see/blind).
Due to the large number of possible random colour changes, lo-
calise, and sense trials were combined into see trials. Each possi-
ble colour change was coded with a number between 1 and 21,
such that a change in either direction was coded with the same
number. colour changes with an adjusted standardized residual
>1.96 were considered to have a significant difference fre-
quency across conditions (Agresti, 2003).
EEG data acquisition
EEG data was recorded with an MRI-compatible cap equipped
with carbon-wired Ag/AgCL electrodes (Braincap MR) from 64
scalp positions according to the international 10-10 system. The
reference electrode was placed at FCz and the ground at AFz. An
additional ECG electrode was positioned on the back to measure
heart rate. An MRI-compatible EEG amplifier was used (Brain-
Amp MR, Brain Products) with a sampling rate of 5000 Hz. This
was positioned at the back of the scanner bore and connected us-
ing ribbon cables that were secured with sandbags. Impedance
was kept below 10 kX for EEG channels and 5 kX for the ECG. EEG
recordings were performed with Brain Vision Recorder Software
(Brain Products) and timings kept constant using a Brain
Products SyncBox to synchronize EEG with the MRI system clock.
EEG pre-processing
Raw EEG data was pre-processed using Brain Vision Analyzer
version 2.1 (Brain Products). Correction for the MR gradient arti-
fact was performed using a baseline corrected sliding average of
MR volumes (Allen et al., 2000). Removal of cardioballistic arti-
facts involved the subtraction of heartbeat artifacts on a second
by second basis, using a sliding average of 21 (Allen et al., 1998).
The delay was detected using the CBC detection solution, indi-
vidually for each subject. Peaks were detected semi-automati-
cally, with a manual check of the algorithm’s estimations.
Independent component analysis (ICA) (Infomax; Bell and
Sejnowski, 1995) was then used to remove further BCG residual
artifacts (range: 1–4 additional independent components (ICs)
removed per participant). As outlined in Debener (2005), the
presence of visual P1 and N1 peaks in the averaged data after
pre-processing was used as an indication of the successful re-
moval of artifacts.
The data was downsampled to 500 Hz to reduce computation
time and then filtered with a high-pass filter of 0.1 Hz to remove
low frequency drift (Butterworth, second order). Contrary to the
pre-registration, a low-pass filter of 40 Hz (rather than 50 Hz)
and a notch filter of 50 Hz were chosen to remove line noise. We
used a lower cutoff frequency given the extent of high-frequency
noise in the EEG data, some of which was related to the helium
Figure 1. Illustration of the experimental paradigm. The number of squares presented varied from 2 to a maximum of 36. Question 1 asked “Did
you see a change?” to which participants could respond “Yes” or “No.” Question 2 asked participants to localise the change, based on a grid
from top left to bottom right. Question 3 asked how certain participants were of their responses, ranging from “1: Very Uncertain” to “4: Very
Certain.” If participants responded “no change” to question 1, they were asked to press any button instead of the localization response
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pump artifact. An ideal low-pass filter should remove all 50 Hz line
noise, however, an additional notch filter was included to remove
any residual noise at this frequency. ICA was used to remove eye-
movement artifacts (Infomax; Bell and Sejnowski, 1995). Two com-
ponents were removed for each participant; one corresponding to
eye-blinks and the other to lateralized eye-movements.
Further analysis was completed using EEGLab (Delorme and
Makeig, 2004). Trials were marked as outliers if any ERP value
was >3 SDs from the mean value of that ERP across all trials (us-
ing the MATLAB function “isoutlier”). Note that we only
searched for outliers in the electrodes used for analysis (P07,
P08, Cz, Pz, and CPz). Trials marked as containing outliers were
excluded from further analysis (M¼ 7 trials, SD ¼ 12.98), as well
as those where a response to any question was not made within
the response time (M¼ 2 trials, SD ¼ 2:79). This step also differed
slightly from the pre-registration, where we originally planned to
use the data inspection feature in Brain Vision Analyzer to re-
move unwanted trials. However, we decided to use a more spe-
cific outlier detection method, focusing on the electrodes and
time windows that were used in the analysis. We therefore chose
not to remove trials where the artifacts were contained within
one or two electrodes that were not used in the analysis, as this
would have reduced the number of available trials.
Segments were then taken from –200 ms to 7000 ms to in-
clude the whole trial, and baseline corrected using a mean of
the data within –200 ms to 0 ms, where 0 ms was the start of the
first display of coloured squares (Fig. 1). We chose the baseline
period to be before the first display onset, rather than the sec-
ond, as we were interested in visual ERPs that occurred in re-
sponse to the both displays. It has also been suggested that
ERPs in response to the first presentation of stimuli are related
to the subsequent perception of change (Pourtois et al., 2006).
EEG analysis
To identify the peaks of the visually evoked potentials (P1 and N1),
a grand average ERP was calculated across all conditions and partic-
ipants, as advised in Luck and Gaspelin (2017), from electrodes P07
and P08. From here, the peaks of interest were determined by iden-
tifying the local maxima/minima of the expected peaks, using the
peak detection function in BrainVision Analyzer. The mean value
within a window around the peak was used instead of the peak
value, as the mean is more robust against noise (Luck, 2014). A win-
dow of 40 ms around the mean was chosen as the appropriate win-
dow for visual ERPs P1 and N1. In relation to the first display onset,
the first P1 was identified at 124 ms, and the first N1 at 142 ms. In
relation to the second display onset, the second P1 was identified at
108 ms, and the second N1 at 168 ms.
Based on previous literature (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2003;
Busch et al., 2010; Tseng et al., 2012), the N2pc was defined as the
mean within 200–400 ms after the second display at occipital
electrodes PO7 and PO8. Over central parietal electrodes Cz, CPz,
and Pz, the VAN was defined within a window of 130–330 ms after
the second display, and the LP within a window of 400–600 ms. We
used window sizes of 200 ms, defined a-priori, in an attempt to be
conservative given the large variation within the literature.
To assess how differences between early visual components
across detection conditions were reflected at each stimulus pre-
sentation, P1, and N1 amplitudes were compared in two sepa-
rate 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVAs, with display (first/
second), and awareness (blind/localise/sense) as the independent
variables. Differences across hemispheres in the N2pc were
analysed with another 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA, with
the independent variables of hemisphere (contralateral/
ipsilateral), and awareness (blind/localise/sense). Amplitudes of
the VAN and the LP were compared in two separate repeated
measures ANOVAs with awareness (blind/localise/sense) as the
independent variable. Where Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indi-
cated that the assumption had been violated, Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used. All post-hoc comparisons were
two-tailed, and corrected for multiple comparisons using false
discovery rate where q ¼ 0.05 (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
Effect sizes are reported as partial eta squared for ANOVA, and
repeated measures Hedge’s g for t-tests (Lakens, 2013).
Single-trial EEG analysis
As listed a-priori in our pre-registration document on the OSF,
we used two methods to extract the single-trial ERP values. The
first method used the raw EEG time series, while the second
used EEG values extracted from the ICA component with maxi-
mum correlation with our ERP of interest. Our reason for using
both methods was to increase our sensitivity for extracting
meaningful single-trial values, given the reduced signal to noise
ratio in EEG data recorded inside the MR environment.
Raw values: for each ERP time window, single-trial values were
calculated as the mean amplitude within the predefined window
for that peak. These values were then baseline corrected by sub-
tracting the mean amplitude within the 200 ms window before the
onset of the first display. We also ran a version of this analysis
where single-trial values were baseline corrected using the mean of
the trial from which they were taken, in an attempt to prevent any
remaining linear trends in the data influencing the general linear
model (GLM) model. However, this did not affect the results.
Outliers were identified as trials where the amplitude was more
than 3 SDs away from the mean amplitude for that ERP. As large
artifacts can raise the mean amplitude, we added the additional
classification of outliers at values þ/– 30lV. These outlier values
were replaced by the mean value across all other trials, as outlined
in Bénar et al. (2007).
ICA derived values: this method was similar to that mentioned
above, with the exception that the single-trial values were taken
from a single ICA component, identified separately for each partici-
pant. First, ICA was computed on the pre-processed data for a sin-
gle subject (FastICA in EEGLab; Hyvärinen and Oja, 1997). For each
IC extracted, a mean IC-ERP was calculated by averaging the time
course across all trials. The average IC-ERP time courses were then
correlated with the average ERP time course from the electrodes of
interest in the pre-processed EEG data; for the LP this was the aver-
age ERP from the central electrodes (Cz, Pz, and CPz). The IC compo-
nent with the highest correlation with the ERP of interest was
inspected to ensure that the topology was as expected; for the LP
this was positivity over the central electrodes. Once selected, the
single-trial values were extracted from the time series of this com-
ponent, as described above. For some participants, the IC with the
highest correlation was an artifact component, identified by visu-
ally inspecting the component’s time series, topography, and fre-
quency spectrum in EEGLab. We also utilized the EEGLab function
“ICLabel” to aid classification of artifact components. When this
was the case (three participants), the IC with the next highest corre-
lation was selected for that participant.
fMRI recording
MRI data was acquired using a 3.0-T whole-body MRI scanner
(Prisma, Siemens) and a 64 channel coil for functional imaging.
Interleaved slices were recorded using a 2D echo planar imaging se-
quence [repetition time (TR) 1630 ms; echo time (TE) 30 ms; flip
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angle 90

; voxel size 3 x 3 mm; gap 3 mm; encoding direction A to P;
distance factor 20%; FOV read 192 mm; number of slices 30; trans-
versal orientation]. Three dummy scans were acquired at the begin-
ning of each block. As well as the functional scans, an anatomical
scan of the entire brain was acquired [3D MPRAGE; saggital; TE
2.37 ms; TR 1800 ms; flip angle 8

; voxel size 0.98 x 0.98 mm; FOV
read 250 mm; slice thickness 0.85 mm; slices per slab 208; ascending
acquisition; phase encoding direction A to P].
fMRI pre-processing
MRI images were pre-processed using the procedure recommended
in SPM12 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Functional images were first
re-aligned per experimental block. These were registered to the
mean image with a sixth degree spline interpolation. Following this
was co-registration of the structural image to aligned functional
images, segmentation of white and gray matter, normalization of
functional images using the deformation field created during seg-
mentation, and normalization of the functional to structural. The
resulting data was smoothed with a 4-mm full-width-half-maxi-
mum Gaussian Kernel, and a high-pass filter with a cut off period
of 128 s was applied. The registration of images was checked visu-
ally at each stage. Parameters not specified here can be assumed as
the default SPM parameters.
fMRI analysis
During first-level analysis, GLMs with event-related designs were
conducted in SPM12, to identify voxels activated in response to
trial type (blind/localise/sense/false alarm/correct rejection).
Regressors were created for each trial type by convolving the
stimulus onset times with the canonical hemodynamic response
function across all blocks (Friston et al., 1994). Each regressor had
a duration matched to the length of visual display, and serial cor-
relations were corrected using the AR(1) method. All fMRI analy-
sis was conducted in relation to the onset of the second display,
where the change could occur. However, given the fast presenta-
tion of the two displays, it is possible that activation from the
first display contributed to the activation recorded during the
second. Each block was modeled with a separate set of regressors
including time derivatives, as we did not perform slice time cor-
rection. Six motion regressors were added as nuisance variables.
For each participant we ran the following contrasts during
first-level analysis; sense > blind, localise > blind, localise > sense,
blind > no-change, sense > false alarm, and false alarm > sense.
We then compared awareness conditions at the second-level
using one-sample t-tests. These contrasts were not run in the
other direction, for example blind > localise, given previous
results that suggest very little activation present for blind trials
(Beck et al., 2001; Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004). An additional
paired-samples t-test was used to identify voxels with activa-
tion that was significantly different between the pair of con-
trasts localise > blind and sense > blind.
The contrasts localise > blind and sense > blind should reveal
voxels with activation specific to full or partial awareness of the
change, respectively, compared to no awareness. As these three
conditions all contain a change in coloured squares, differences
between them should reflect the participant’s level of aware-
ness. Previous fMRI contrasts for change detection (detected
versus undetected) have identified activation specific to aware-
ness of the change in the bilateral parietal lobe, right dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex, and right fusiform gyrus (Beck et al.,
2001). The corresponding contrast here is localise > blind, where
we may expect to find similar frontal and parietal activations.
As previously discussed, it is unclear whether the contrast
sense > blind will result in similar activations, or whether the
sense condition is simply another form of change blindness that
can be explained by overconfidence or participant guessing. The
contrast between sense and false alarm trials is useful to deter-
mine if sensing is similar to false alarms, meaning that partici-
pants did not detect anything changing during the change trials
and were overconfident in their awareness.
In the contrast localise > sense, we should identify voxels spe-
cifically activated when participants can both detect and local-
ise the change, compared to only change detection. These areas
would therefore be indicated in the facilitation of complete vi-
sual awareness, compared to sensing alone. Contrasting blind
and no-change trials should reveal activation specific to the
presence of the change, despite the participant being unable to
detect it. Previous results for this contrast suggest activation in
the right lingual gyrus, right fusiform gyrus, and right inferior
frontal gyrus (Beck et al., 2001).
To identify voxels with activation that correlated with the
change in task difficulty over time, a separate GLM model was
constructed with one regressor for the onsets of all trials, and a
parametric regressor using the difficulty (or number of squares
presented) at each trial. To identify voxels with activation that
correlated with the change in participant certainty over time, a
separate GLM model was constructed with one regressor for the
onsets of all trials, and a parametric regressor using the cer-
tainty value reported by the participant at each trial.
Across all fMRI analyses, we report clusters with a minimum
size of 20 voxels and a cluster-level family-wise error (FWE) cor-
rected p < 0.001. Extended local maxima were labeled using two
methods that provided overlapping results; the automated anatom-
ical labeling toolbox in SPM (12), with a local maximum radius of
5 mm, and the SPM Anatomy toolbox, which for compatibility rea-
sons used an older version of MATLAB (2014a) and SPM (SPM8).
MNI co-ordinates were used to label voxels according to Brodmann
areas. The SPM render function was used to plot our results on the
cortex of an MNI brain, and MRICron was used to create multi-slice
views of the t-score maps for each contrast of interest.
ERP-informed fMRI analysis
For ERP-informed fMRI analysis, a first-level model with one re-
gressor was constructed for the onset of all change trials (blind/
localise/sense), with single-trial ERP values included as a para-
metric regressor. The LP ERP in response to the change display
was chosen a-priori for this analysis, as significant differences
have previously been identified between awareness conditions
within this late parietal potential (Fernandez-Duque and
Thornton, 2003; Busch et al., 2010; Scrivener et al., 2019). A sec-
ond regressor was added for the onset of all no change trials.
Motion parameters were also included as nuisance variables.
An additional (not pre-registered) ERP-informed-fMRI analy-
sis was performed, using the visual P1 and N1 amplitudes in re-
lation to the change display. While some results suggest that
ERPs as early as the P1 and N1 reflect conscious awareness, it is
debated whether this is case (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010;
Förster et al., 2020). We therefore considered it valuable to check
whether any regions of the brain exhibited BOLD responses that
correlated with fluctuations in these early ERP responses across
time and awareness conditions.
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Behavioral Results
Accuracy for question 1, in which participants had to identify a
change, had a mean of 54% (range ¼ 39 69%;SD ¼ 9%).
Accuracy for question 2, in which participants had to localise the
change, had a mean of 72% (range ¼ 61 86%;SD ¼ 8%). The
mean difficulty level given to each participant ranged from 6 to
23 squares (M ¼ 16;SD ¼ 4), with the maximum difficulty experi-
enced by each participant ranging from 18 to 36 (M ¼ 27;SD ¼ 5).
D’prime scores ranged from 0.940 to 2.30 (M ¼ 1:38;SD ¼ 0:38).
One person had a negative criterion, meaning that they had a re-
sponse bias toward false alarms. All other participants had posi-
tive criterion, indicating a conservative response strategy
(M ¼ 0:61;SD ¼ 0:33). D’prime scores were significantly different
from 0 in a one-sampled t-test, indicating that participants
could discriminate between change and no change trials,
tð19Þ ¼ 16:263; P < 0:001.
Mean difficulty correlated with mean location accuracy
(r ¼ 0:543; P ¼ 0:013) and d’prime (r ¼ 0:601; P ¼ 0:005), but not
with mean detection accuracy (r ¼ 0:371; P ¼ 0:107). Maximum
difficulty also correlated with mean location accuracy
(r ¼ 0:537; P ¼ 0:015) and d’prime (r ¼ 0:482; P ¼ 0:031), but not
with mean detection accuracy (r ¼ 0:349; P ¼ 0:131).
The percentage of false alarm trials (12:23%68:64) was lower
than the percentage of sense trials (28:07%67:73) tð19Þ ¼ 6:815;
P < 0:001; grm ¼ 1:85, suggesting that sense trials occurred more
often than participants made false alarms. Additionally, the
percentage of false alarms was not significantly correlated with
the percentage of sense trials (r ¼ 0:198; P ¼ 0:403).
Out of the 20 participants included in the analysis, 15 were
slower to respond when they were blind to the change, and com-
pared to no-change trials. Reaction times for blind trials were
also significantly slower than no-change trials (0:61760:176 s),
tð19Þ ¼ 3:613; P ¼ 0:002; grm ¼ 0:25. Therefore, despite being
blind to the change, the presence of a change in the display in-
creased reaction times, and particularly for trials where the par-
ticipant was uncertain.
We found a significant effect of location of the changed item
(outside/central) on awareness (blind/localise/sense), v2(2) ¼ 26.68,
p < 0.001, as participants were more likely to be blind to the
change when it occurred on the outside of the display (blind out-
side: 911 trials, central: 619). There were also a greater number
of sense trials for outside changes, suggesting that these
changes may be harder to localise than central changes (sense
outside: 290 trials, central: 220). The location had the least influ-
ence on localise trials (localise outside: 627, central: 619).
The hemisphere of the display in which the change occurred
(left/right) had no significant effect on participant awareness
(blind/localise/sense), v2(2) ¼ 4.941, P ¼ 0.085 (blind left: 781 trials,
right: 749; localise left: 651, right: 607; sense left: 236, right 276).
Additional behavioral analysis and results can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
There was a significant effect of colour change on aware-
ness, v2ð20Þ ¼ 120:342; P < 0:001. Colour change pairs with a sig-
nificantly higher number of blind trials were: yellow/green,
yellow/cyan, green/cyan, blue/cyan, and white/cyan. Colour
change pairs with a significantly higher number of see trials
were: magenta/red, cyan/red, blue/red, and white/red. Overall,
colour changes including red were more likely to be detected,
given the prevalence of colour pairings that included red in the
see condition. In the other direction, colour changes including
cyan were more likely to be missed, as there were more blind tri-
als with cyan in the colour pairing.
EEG Results
P1 and N1
For P1 amplitudes, the main effect of awareness was not signifi-
cant, Fð2; 38Þ ¼ 0:568; P ¼ 0:572:; g2 ¼ 0:029. Display was also not
significant, Fð1; 19Þ ¼ 0:143; P ¼ 0:709; g2 ¼ 0:007. The interaction
between awareness and display was not significant, Fð2; 38Þ ¼
3:250; P ¼ 0:050; g2 ¼ 0:146 (Fig. 2). (Blind first display M ¼ 1:933;
SD ¼ 4:106, second M ¼ 1:401;SD ¼ 5:052; localise first M ¼ 0:606;
SD ¼ 2:706, second M ¼ 1:108;SD ¼ 5:858; sense first M ¼ 0:509;
SD ¼ 2:738, and second M ¼ 2:020;SD ¼ 5:900).
For the N1, the main effect of awareness was not significant,
Fð2; 38Þ ¼ 2:008; P ¼ 0:148; g2 ¼ 0:096. Display was also not signif-
icant, Fð1; 19Þ ¼ 0:68:; P ¼ 0:797; g2 ¼ 0:004, nor was the interac-
tion between awareness and display, Fð2; 38Þ ¼ 2:046; P ¼ 0:143;
g2 ¼ 0:097 (Fig. 2). (Blind first display M ¼ 1:526;SD ¼ 4:096, sec-
ond M ¼ 2:178;SD ¼ 4:469; localise first M ¼ 3:609;SD ¼ 4:246,
second M ¼ 2:783;SD ¼ 5:658; sense first M ¼ 3:500;
SD ¼ 3:662, and second M ¼ 2:881;SD ¼ 5:279).
N2pc
The main effect of hemisphere on N2pc amplitudes was not sig-
nificant, Fð1; 19Þ ¼ 0:338; P ¼ 0:568; g2 ¼ 0:018, nor was the
main effect of awareness, Fð2;38Þ ¼ 0:878; P ¼ 0:424; g2 ¼ 0:044.
The interaction was not significant, Fð2; 38Þ ¼ 0:572; P ¼ 0:569;
g2 ¼ 0:029.
As we had strong hypotheses about the presence of an N2pc
for localise trials, we also ran corrected post-hoc pairwise com-
parisons across awareness levels. A significantly increased neg-
ativity across both hemispheres was found for localise trials
(M ¼ 1:573;SD ¼ 4:378) compared to blind (M ¼ 0:810;
SD ¼ 4:856) P ¼ 0.038. Blind and sense (M ¼ 1:720;SD ¼ 5:444)
were not significantly different, P ¼ 0.259, nor were sense and lo-
calise, P ¼ 0.862.
Visual awareness negativity
The main effect of awareness on the VAN was not significant
Fð2; 38Þ ¼ 0:029; P ¼ 0:971; g2 ¼ 0:002. (Blind M ¼ 0:059;SD ¼ 3:427,
localise M ¼ 0:184;SD ¼ 3:093, sense M ¼ 0:104;SD ¼ 3:295).
Late positivity
There was a main effect of awareness on LP amplitudes
Fð2; 38Þ ¼ 3:776; P ¼ 0:032; g2 ¼ 0:166. In corrected post-hoc com-
parisons, localise trials (M ¼ 2:270;SD ¼ 4:130) had a significantly
greater LP amplitude than blind (M ¼ 0:032;SD ¼ 2:158), P ¼
0.024, PbonfRM ¼ 0:028. However, sense (M ¼ 1:069;SD ¼ 3:801)
was not significantly different to blind, P ¼ 0.130, PbonfRM ¼ 0:634
or localise trials, P ¼ 0.174, PbonfRM ¼ 0:446 (Fig. 3).
fMRI Results
Awareness
For the contrast localise >blind, increased BOLD activation was
found in the bilateral occipital cortex (BA17/V1, BA18/V2, and
hOC4v/V4), bilateral parietal cortex (BA40/PFt, BA3b, and BA2),
left putamen (BA49), left fusiform gyrus (BA37), right insula
(BA13), right pre-motor cortex (BA6, spanning middle frontal,
superior frontal, and pre-central gyri), and (see Fig. 4 for signifi-
cant clusters and Table 1 for additional values).
For the contrast sense >blind, increased activation was found
in bilateral occipital cortex (BA17/V1, BA18/V2), left pre-motor
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cortex (BA6, spanning middle frontal, superior frontal, and pre-
central gyri), superior medial gyrus (BA8), parietal cortex (BA40,
BA7/hIP3), and left ACC (BA32), and (see Fig. 5 for significant
clusters and Table 2 for additional values).
We also looked for any activation that was significantly
greater in one contrast than the other (localise >blind versus.
sense >blind). However, no significant activations remained after
correction for multiple comparisons. No voxels survived for the
Figure 2. ERP plot showing the mean of electrodes PO7 and PO8, for each awareness condition. Condition means for the values within the
shaded time windows were used for ERP analysis for the P1 and N1
Figure 3. ERP plot showing a mean of electrodes Cz, CPz, and Pz, for each awareness condition. Condition means for the values within the
shaded time window were used for ERP analysis of the VAN and LP
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following contrasts; localise >sense, sense >localise, blind >no
change, sense >false alarm, or false alarm >sense.
Post-hoc conjunction analysis
Given that the contrasts localise versus blind and sense versus
blind revealed similar networks of activation, we ran a conjunc-
tion analysis to determine which voxels were significantly acti-
vated in both contrasts (note that this analysis was not
included in our pre-registration). To do this, we entered the two
first-level contrasts for each participant into an ANOVA at the
second-level (independence not assumed). We then ran a con-
junction analysis across both contrasts to identify common vox-
els, using the conjunction null hypothesis as suggested in
Nichols et al. (2005) . Significant activation was identified in the
visual cortex (BA18, BA19) and inferior parietal cortex (BA7,
BA39) (Table 5 and Fig. 6).
Difficulty and certainty
The parametric regressor of participant certainty revealed sig-
nificant activation in the right visual cortex (BA17/V1, BA18/V2)
and right parietal cortex (BA40) (Table 3). The parametric regres-
sor of task difficulty (the number of squares presented per trial)
revealed significant activation in the left visual cortex (BA18,
V2) (Table 4).
ERP-informed fMRI
No significant voxels were identified for the LP-informed fMRI
analysis using either method for extracting the single-trial val-
ues. In addition, no significant voxels were identified using the
visual P1 or N1 in relation to the change display.
Discussion
The main aim of this change blindness experiment was to dis-
tinguish between trials in which participants could both detect
and localise a change in coloured square (localise), versus those
in which they could only detect it (sense), or not detect it at all
(blind), using combined EEG-fMRI. In the EEG data, the late parie-
tal positivity ERP, localise trials were significantly higher in am-
plitude than blind trials as previously found (Scrivener et al.,
2019), but sense trials were not distinguishable from those where
participants were blind to the change. Similarly, no differences
were found between sense and blind trials in the N2pc or VAN. It
is not clear whether this is due to false positive findings in the
Figure 4. Top: voxels activated for the contrast localise > blind trials. Multiple comparisons were controlled using a cluster-level family-wise error
correction where p < 0.001, as well as a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels. Bottom: T-scores thresholded at a minimum t¼ 3
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Table 1. Voxels significantly activated for the contrast localise > blind, cluster FWE p < 0.001, minimum 20 voxels
Brain region BA Hemisphere Cluster size MNI co-ordinates Z score T (peak level) Cluster-level FWE (P)
x y z
Lingual gyrus 17 Right 12408 4 –82 –2 5.36 9.64 <0.001
18 (hOC4v) Left –22 –70 –6
18 Left –6 –76 0
Inferior parietal cortex 40 (PFt) Left 421 –38 –30 42 4.71 7.33 <0.001
Post-central gyrus 3 b Left –44 –30 52
2 Left –40 –42 58
Putamen 49 Left 90 –18 8 8 4.25 6.08 <0.001
–22 0 6
Middle frontal gyrus 6 Left 182 –28 4 56 4.18 5.89 <0.001
Superior frontal gyrus 6 Left –26 –6 60
Pre-central gyrus 6 Left –30 –22 64
Insula 13 Right 96 28 22 –10 4.08 5.66 <0.001
32 28 –2
26 24 2
Inferior temporal gyrus 39 Left 84 –56 –56 12 3.71 4.87 <0.001
Middle temporal gyrus 37 Left –48 –58 –4
–60 –52 –6
Inferior parietal cortex 40 (PFt) Right 110 44 –24 38 3.62 4.69 <0.001
Post-central gyrus 3 b Right 50 –18 40
40 –28 46
Figure 5. Top: voxels activated for the contrast sense > blind trials. Multiple comparisons were controlled using a cluster-level family-wise error
correction where p < 0.001, as well as a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels. Bottom: T-scores thresholded at a minimum t¼ 3
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previous study, the smaller signal to noise ratio in the combined
EEG-fMRI data, or the relatively small sample size.
The fMRI results revealed significant differences in BOLD ac-
tivation for both localise and sense trials when compared to blind,
suggesting that they are separable to trials where participants
were completely unaware of the change. These results suggest
that the sense condition may be distinguishable from the tradi-
tional blind condition, meaning that subjects may have access
to more information when they are able to sense a change.
However, the contrast between localise and sense conditions
Table 2. Voxels significantly activated for the contrast sense > blind, cluster FWE p < 0.001, minimum 20 voxels
Brain region BA Hemisphere Cluster size MNI co-ordinates Z score T (peak level) Cluster-level FWE (P)
x y z
Pre-central gyrus 6 Right 145 32 –4 48 4.94 8.07 <0.001
Middle frontal gyrus 6 Right 24 16 50
Superior frontal gyrus 6 Right 24 8 60
Calcarine gyrus 17 Left 5526 –4 –96 4 4.92 8 <0.001
18 Right 12 –72 10
Lingual gyrus 17 Left –6 –82 2
Superior medial gyrus 8 Left 88 –2 26 0 3.96 5.38 <0.001
Anterior cingulate gyrus 24 Left –4 28 30
Superior medial gyrus 8 Right 8 24 42
Inferior parietal sulcus 40 Left 87 –48 –42 56 3.67 4.78 <0.001
7 (hIP3) Left –32 –48 49
40 Left –40 –44 50
Table 3. Parametric regressor: participant certainty, cluster FWE p < 0.001, minimum 20 voxels
Brain region BA Hemisphere Cluster size MNI co-ordinates Z Score T (peak level) Cluster-level FWE (P)
x y z
Lingual gyrus 18 Right 160 14 –74 0 4.11 5.74 <0.001
Calcarine gyrus 17 Right 6 –82 8
10 –88 12
Inferior parietal cortex 40 Right 104 50 –34 48 3.84 5.12 <0.001
48 –42 48
60 –34 34
Table 4. Parametric regressor: task difficulty, cluster FWE P < 0.001, minimum 20 voxels
Brain region BA Hemisphere Cluster size MNI co-ordinates Z Score T (peak level) Cluster-level FWE (P)
x y z
Lingual gyrus 18 Left – –16 –92 –6 4.23 6.02 0.003
–10 –86 –12
Table 5. Conjunction analysis: voxels activated for both localise versus blind and sense versus blind contrasts
Brain region BA Hemisphere Cluster size MNI co-ordinates Z Score T (peak level) Cluster-level FWE (P)
x y z
Lingual gyrus 18 Left 6116 –4 –70 6 5.51 7.35 <0.001
–4 –80 –8
–18 –72 –10
Inferior parietal cortex 7 Right 445 28 –76 44 4.91 6.16 <0.001
Occipital cortex 19 Right 22 –90 22
Inferior parietal cortex 39 Right 34 –76 38
Inferior parietal cortex 7 Right 421 18 –70 42 4.73 5.84 <0.001
22 –72 54
8 –64 52
Cluster FWE P < 0.001, minimum 20 voxels.
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revealed no significant activations, and a conjunction analysis
revealed overlapping activation in visual and parietal regions.
These two levels of awareness may therefore be associated with
activation within a similar network, and the link between brain
activity and behavioral differences remains unclear.
Behavioral
One explanation for the presence of a sense condition in change
blindness is that it reflects a liberal response criteria, such that
participants report seeing a change even though they were not
certain that it occurred (Simons and Ambinder, 2005). In other
words, they make a “false alarm” during change trials. If this is
the case, then these trials may be similar in number to false alarm
trials, where participants incorrectly report a change for identical
displays where they could not have seen a change. We found
that participants had fewer false alarms than sense trials, and the
percentage of these trials across participants was not correlated.
This suggests that sense trials may not be attributed to a liberal
response criterion of the participants, as the tendency of partici-
pants to make a false alarm did not influence the number of times
they could sense a change. However, this differs from previous
results, where a significant correlation was found in the
percentage of the two trial types (Scrivener et al., 2019). Further
behavioral data may therefore be needed to confirm this
relationship.
Previous studies have also reported that participants
responded “no change” more quickly for no-change trials, com-
pared to change trials (Williams and Simons, 2000; Mitroff et al.,
2004). The participant’s response is the same in both trial types,
but the presence of a change is different. This suggests that
even when they fail to detect the change in a change trial, they
take longer to respond. We therefore compared reaction times
for no-change trials and blind trials. Out of the 20 participants,
15 were slower to respond when they were blind to the change,
and compared to no-change trials. Reaction times for blind trials
were also significantly slower than no-change trials, meaning
that even when participants did not notice the change, its pres-
ence increased their reaction times. It is possible that in blind
trials, some information may be available to the participant,
leading to slower reaction times, but not enough for them to be
confident to report the change.
The location of the square that changed in colour during the
experiment had a significant influence on the likelihood that
the change was detected; changes closer to the central fixation
were detected at a higher frequency across participants than
those further away. One explanation is that the participants
Figure 6. Conjunction analysis: voxels significantly activated for both localise >blind and sense >blind contrasts. Multiple comparisons were con-
trolled using a cluster-level family-wise error correction where p < 0.001, as well as a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels
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were asked to fixate at the center of the screen, and therefore
their overt attention was directed here during the trial. As at-
tention has been found to correlate with change detection, this
finding is not surprising (Rensink et al., 1997).
We also found a significant effect of colour on awareness,
such that changes involving the colour red were more likely to
be detected, and changes involving cyan were less likely to be
detected. We hypothesize that the increased salience of red
squares caused a pop-out effect during these trials, leading to
increase detection of the change. In the opposite direction, the
colour cyan was perhaps more similar to other colours, such as
white, making it more difficult to detect changes. Due to the
large number of colour changes we had to collapse over the
change direction (including both from and to a colour), and also
over localise and sense conditions. It would be interesting to es-
tablish whether the advantage for change detection provided by
the presence of red would also provide an advantage for change
localization. If the colour red does initiate a pop-out effect, then
we would hypothesize an advantage for both identification and
localization of the change (Ball and Busch, 2015). Future studies
aiming to establish more control over change detection across
trials may wish to consider this effect of colour during experi-
ment design.
Throughout the behavioral analysis presented here, the
mean across trials for each participant was used as a summary
statistic for further analysis. This is a relatively simple method
for analysis of reaction time and accuracy data, and may not al-
ways be the most appropriate. For example, Rousselet and
Wilcox (2020) outline the potential problems arising from using
summary statistics, such as the mean and median, when com-
paring skewed distributions. Other possible approaches include
hierarchical shift functions (Rouder et al., 2005; Wilcox and
Erceg-Hurn, 2012), designed to overcome problems caused by
asymmetric distributions, and linear mixed models (Lo and
Andrews, 2015; Frömer et al., 2018). Using the mean to summa-
rize complex behavior, such as reaction times, has its limita-
tions and other statistics or methodologies may sometimes be
more appropriate.
EEG
For the late parietal positivity ERP, localise trials were signifi-
cantly higher in amplitude than blind trials. Other studies have
also reported increased LP amplitudes for detected versus unde-
tected changes (Fernandez-Duque and Thornton, 2003; Busch
et al., 2010), which has been suggested to reflect conscious
awareness of changes (Railo et al., 2011), and participant confi-
dence (Eimer and Mazza, 2005). However, sense trials were not
distinguishable from trials where participants were blind to the
change. This contradicts our own results from a previous study
where all three awareness conditions were distinguishable
within the LP (Scrivener et al., 2019). There is therefore increas-
ing evidence that the LP varies reliably between detected versus
undetected changes, but whether it can be detected during sense
trials is unclear. Note that the presence of a significant LP for lo-
calise, but not for sense, should not be used as evidence that the
two are different as the post-hoc comparison was not statisti-
cally significant.
For the N2pc results, it should be emphasized that the main
effect of hemisphere was not significant. Therefore, the post-
hoc comparison in amplitude between localise and blind trials
does not reflect the traditional asymmetry of the N2pc compo-
nent, with a greater negativity in the contralateral hemisphere.
It can only be concluded that there was an increased negativity
for localise trials across both hemispheres, and may be better
interpreted as an N2 component. This is a common finding, and
in a review of the ERP correlates of visual awareness (Koivisto
and Revonsuo, 2010) the majority of change blindness paper
reported enhanced negativity in the N1–N2 range for detected
changes (with the exception of Fernandez-Duque et al., 2003 and
Niedeggen et al., 2001).
In a previous EEG study, we did find a significant N2pc for
both localise and sense conditions, including a significant main
effect of hemisphere (Scrivener et al., 2019). We concluded that
the presence of an N2pc for both awareness conditions indi-
cated a shift in attention toward the hemisphere of the change
(Luck and Ford, 1998), but that this shift in attention was not
sufficient to facilitate correct localization in sense trials. In this
experiment, we failed to find any evidence for this shift in either
awareness condition, as characterized by the N2pc.
We found no statistically significant effects of awareness in
the P1, N1, or VAN ERP analysis, similar to our previous results
(Scrivener et al., 2019). In a recent review of the ERPs associated
with visual awareness (Förster et al., 2020), the authors con-
cluded that early P1 and N1 peaks are unlikely to be the earliest
signature of visual awareness, and no longer discuss these
peaks as possible candidates. This is due to increasing evidence
against their association with conscious detection, which our
EEG and ERP-informed fMRI findings cannot dispute. However,
they argue that the VAN is the most likely candidate for a
marker of conscious detection, and our results are contrary to
several previous findings. One possible explanation is the differ-
ence in experimental paradigm. In many cases, awareness is
modulated by the perceptual difficulty of the stimuli, for exam-
ple by the contrast. However, the stimuli in a change blindness
paradigm remain at the same contrast across all trials, and diffi-
culty is instead modulated by the number of distractors.
Another suggestion from our previous work (Scrivener et al.,
2019) is that the VAN requires both the location and identity of
an object to be stored, such that it is available for conscious re-
port. As our participants were not able to identify the location of




One aim of this experiment was to improve our knowledge of
the neurological basis of the sense condition with the addition of
fMRI results. We found largely overlapping activation for both
localise and sense conditions when contrasted with trials where
participants were blind to the change in coloured square. Both
awareness conditions had significantly greater activation in the
early visual cortex (B18, V2), the left supramarginal gyrus in the
inferior parietal lobe (BA40), and the left pre-motor cortex (BA6).
The posterior parietal cortex and early visual cortex are com-
monly implicated as storage sites for the contents of visual
working memory (Todd and Marois, 2005; Edin et al., 2009;
D’Esposito and Postle, 2015), and previous fMRI studies of
change detection also found activations in these areas (Beck
et al., 2001; Huettel et al., 2001; Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004).
Using MVPA, Christophel et al. (2012) identified stimuli-specific
information contained in both early visual and posterior parie-
tal areas (around the intraparietal sulcus), further implicating
these regions as storage sites for visual representations. The ac-
tivation of these visual and parietal regions in both localise and
sense conditions suggests the presence of visual representations
of the stimuli for both levels of awareness. This supports the
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hypothesis that change blindness may arise from a failure to
compare two displays or images, rather than a failure to encode
the visual information (Hollingworth et al., 2001; Simons et al.,
2005). Therefore, the inability of participants to localise the
change during sense trials may not be explained by a lack of pa-
rietal representation, as activity in the dorsal stream (BA18 and
BA40) was greater than during blind trials.
Activations found only in the localise contrast (but not for
sense) were located in the primary sensory cortex (BA2, BA3b),
putamen (BA49), and insula (BA13). This forms a wider network
of activation than the sense versus blind contrast, including mid-
brain structures. The insula and putamen are both hypothe-
sized to act as hubs in key brain networks relating to cognitive
control, and their activation specific to localise trials may indi-
cate their role in facilitating full awareness of the change. More
specifically, the insula forms an integrative hub between atten-
tion and salience networks (Eckert et al., 2009; Menon and
Uddin, 2010), balancing external attentional cues with internal
performance monitoring (Uddin et al., 2017). In contrast, the pu-
tamen is suggested to be a central component of a frontal-sub-
cortical network (including the superior parietal and premotor
cortex) related to cognitive control (van Belle et al., 2014), and
has anatomical connections with rostral parietal areas (Jarbo
and Verstynen, 2015). Further, patients with putamen lesions
show symptoms of left-sided neglect (Karnath and Rorden,
2012), which is often thought of as a disorder of attention.
Overall, the pattern of findings indicates both anatomical and
functional links between the putamen/insula and parietal cor-
tex, which may explain their increased activation during localise
trials. However, it should be noted that our fMRI sequence
parameters were not specifically designed for accurate record-
ing of mid-brain structures, which may influence the reliability
of these results (Eapen et al., 2011).
Activation in the ACC was found in the sense versus blind
contrast. The ACC is commonly linked to functional networks
underlying attention (Ungerleider and Leslie, 2000), and more
specifically in boosting attention toward task-relevant stimuli
(Orr and Weissman, 2009; Kim et al., 2016). Further, Mitchell and
Cusack (2008) found ACC activation that correlated with esti-
mates of the number of items stored by each participant during
a working memory task. If this activation reflects increased at-
tention toward the changed stimuli, then it would be expected
to occur in both awareness conditions, as attention facilitates
change detection (Rensink et al., 1997). However, ACC activation
was not found in the localise condition, and therefore may not
be necessary for full awareness of the change.
A more fitting explanation of the ACC activation specific to
the sense condition is that it reflects error processing during the
task. This is because sense trials contained a response error,
where participants incorrectly localised the change. Using com-
bined EEG-fMRI, ACC activation has been linked to error proc-
essing and is correlated with the error-related negativity in EEG
(Debener, 2005; Iannaccone et al., 2015). Activity in this area
could therefore relate to the incorrect responses of the partici-
pants during sense trials. However, it should be noted that acti-
vation in the ACC is found for a wide range of tasks and the
specificity of this activation is debated (Dehaene, 2018). It could
be argued that blind trials also contain a response error, as the
participant failed to report a change that did occur. This should
therefore also activate the ACC, if ACC activation reflects error
monitoring (and that this error monitoring need not be con-
scious). Compared to blind trials, sense trials contained activa-
tion in visual (BA18) and parietal (BA40) areas, and the
participant correctly reported the change. However, it is also
possible that the ACC activation relates to the participant’s
awareness of their own failure to localise the change, which is
not relevant to blind trials where the participant can be very
confident that no change occurred.
In relation to theories of visual consciousness, our results
could be interpreted in support for the “partial awareness
hypothesis” given the distinction in fMRI between blind and
sense trials. Although participants were aware of the change
during sense trials, their inability to provide further information
suggests a less detailed representation of the visual display.
Further, localise trials were associated with similar activity to
sense in visual and parietal areas, perhaps reflecting activity re-
lating to the “all-or-nothing” ignition of change detection.
However, the additional activation related to localise trials may
characterize an improved representation that facilitated correct
localization. This hypothesis is speculative, and clarity is
needed on the distinction between localise and sense conditions.
For example, with future work using MVPA it would be possible
to determine if the pattern of information stored within the
brain is similar between these two levels of awareness. This
would provide more information regarding the nature of stored
representations during the task, and identify regions where
these representations differ. Given the behavioral and phenom-
enological differences between localise and sense trials, it is rea-
sonable to expect that somewhere in the brain should contain
differing representations for these two levels of awareness, and
therefore be driving the variation in participant response.
Difficulty and certainty
Using participant certainty at each trial as a parametric regres-
sor, we found significant activations in the right visual cortex
(BA18, V2), and bilateral supramarginal gyrus (BA40). These
regions were also found to increase with awareness of the
change (localise and sense trials), possibly due to the relationship
between awareness and certainty. Specifically, when partici-
pants were aware of the change and could localise it correctly,
they were likely to report higher certainty in their responses.
The parametric regressor of task difficulty (the number of
squares presented per trial) revealed significant activation in
the visual cortex (BA18, V2). This finding likely reflects the
greater visual stimulation associated with a more complex vi-
sual array. In previous literature, parietal activity has also been
correlated with set size and the number of objects stored in vi-
sual working memory (Mitchell and Cusack, 2008). Activity also
predicts individual differences in working memory capacity
(Vogel and Machizawa, 2004). We failed to find this effect, which
may be explained by the variation in set sizes that were pre-
sented across participants. Instead of presenting a number of
blocks with a number of difficulty levels, the difficulty was mod-
ulated in real time depending on participant performance. Also,
the change in response may not be linear in our case; during
easy trials, the response may scale linearly with the number of
trials, until the maximum capacity of the participant is reached.
Past this point, the number of items may exceed the capacity,
and therefore fail to be represented or modulate the brain acti-
vation in these regions.
ERP-informed fMRI
Our pre-registered analysis method of LP-informed fMRI
revealed no significant results. The additional exploratory P1
and N1-informed fMRI was also not significant. We therefore
failed to identify voxels with activation that significantly co-
varied with fluctuations in the EEG. It is acknowledged that
EEG-BOLD couplings are weak, as they measure the effects
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remaining after the mean evoked BOLD responses are explained
(Liu et al., 2016). However, previous combined EEG-fMRI experi-
ments have managed to identify correlates of EEG using ERP-in-
formed fMRI (Debener, 2005; Eimer and Mazza, 2005), even if at
liberal correction thresholds.
One possible reason for the failure to find significant ERP-in-
formed BOLD effects is the reduced signal to noise in EEG sig-
nals recorded inside the MRI environment. A second possibility
is the method that we used to quantify single-trial ERPs. There
is no single method for ERP-informed fMRI analysis, and we
therefore chose to run two separate analysis pipelines in case of
disparaging results. In the first, we used raw values from the
EEG time series. This method is susceptible to noise artifacts,
and any trials in which the noise signal is greater than the neu-
rological signal of interest will reduce the chance of observing
an effect across conditions. Given the increased number of arti-
facts in EEG-fMRI data, and the absence of perfect artifact re-
moval routines, it is possible that the signal to noise ratio was
too small in the raw single-trial ERP values.
In the second method, we used ICA to identify components
matching our ERP of interest, with the hypothesis that noise sig-
nals would have a reduced contribution to the single-trial val-
ues extracted from this component (Debener, 2005; Wirsich
et al., 2014). However, this method also produced null results in
ERP-informed fMRI analysis. A downside to this method is that
its success is dependent on (i) the algorithm accurately separat-
ing ICs, and (ii) the correct selection of the components contain-
ing the ERP of interest. Other possible processing steps used in
ERP-informed fMRI include linear classifiers (Goldman et al.,
2009; Walz et al., 2015), autoregressive models (Nguyen et al.,
2014), and spatial laplacian filters (Liu et al., 2016), to name only
a few. However, it is not within the scope of our pre-registered
analysis to adjust the pre-processing or analysis steps any
further.
Conclusion
Overall, one of the main aims of this experiment was to estab-
lish if the sense condition is separable from other awareness
conditions in neural signals, as measured using EEG and fMRI.
While the phenomenological experience of sensing differs from
full awareness, it remains unclear whether this arises from a
distinct state of neural activation, or whether these trials can be
explained by explicit behavioral mechanisms such as partici-
pant response errors or lack of confidence. The strongest evi-
dence presented here is the difference in fMRI activation for
blind trials compared to sense trials. Across our sample, there
was a greater spread of activation within areas such as the early
visual cortex and inferior parietal sulcus when participants sus-
pected a change, compared to when they missed it completely.
This suggests that sense trials were measurably different to blind
trials, and that participants did have access to more informa-
tion regarding the change.
However, the contrast between sense and localise trials,
where participants had full awareness, revealed no significant
differences in activation. Additionally, the conjunction analysis
revealed an overlapping occipitoparietal network of activation
for these two levels of awareness. This suggests common activ-
ity related to the awareness of the change itself. In line with the
“partial awareness hypothesis,” it may be that a degraded repre-
sentation of the visual display within these regions contributed
to failed localization during sense trials.
While we attempted to distinguish between true sense trials
and localise trials with an error using participant certainty, the
number of sense certain responses was low. This meant that di-
viding the awareness conditions into certain/uncertain for EEG
or fMRI analysis was not feasible. Future experiments could fo-
cus on obtaining higher trial numbers, which would hopefully
facilitate this analysis. However, the very nature of the sense
condition means that participants are unlikely to be “certain”
during many of the trials. One way around this would be to in-
clude a response option for participants to indicate if they think
that they made a response error, although this would only iden-
tify trials where the participants were aware of their mistake.
Several previous studies investigating change detection and
partial awareness have used eye-tracking data to establish that
fixations can occur close to the location of a change, even in the
absence of full awareness (O’Regan et al., 2000; Caplovitz et al.,
2008; Galpin et al., 2008). Given that we found an effect of change
location on the likelihood of detection, it would also have been
beneficial to measure participants’ eye movements during the
experiment, especially to investigate fixations during sense tri-
als. Due to the complexity of combined EEG-fMRI and the al-
ready time-consuming set up, we did not add eye-tracking to
this experiment. However, it would be an interesting avenue for
future research.
In summary, our data suggests that the phenomenological
experience of sensing a change is associated with increased ac-
tivity in visual, parietal, and anterior circulate cortices, when
compared to change blind trials. Given this increased activation
including areas that are commonly implicated as the storage
sites of visual working memory, we argue that sensing may not
be caused by a lack of representation of the visual display.
Instead, sensing may reflect unsuccessful comparison of the two
displays (Hollingworth et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2005), or a de-
graded representation that prevents accurate localization of the
change in space.
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